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Abstract 
 
Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This 
explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article 
studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We 
argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could 
conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military 
officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and 
empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular 
pronounced in non-democracies, i.e., military academies have diverse effects across regime 
types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil-military relations. 
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we 
suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge, 
predominantly in authoritarian states. 
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Introduction 
Despite its importance for a military’s structure and performance, as well its obvious implications 
for civil-military relations in general, military professionalism remains insufficiently understood. 
Powell (2012: 1022) recently stressed that “though military professionalism […] has widely been 
said to impact the military’s willingness to attempt a coup, efforts to quantitatively explain this 
aspect are virtually nonexistent.” This research seeks to address this shortcoming and to contribute 
to the broad literature on civil-military relations, military education, professionalism, and coups 
d’état by examining how the establishment of military academies, one observable implication and 
closely-related aspect of military professionalism, affects civil-military relations.  
A military academy is a state-controlled military school, which graduates officer cadets to their 
commissions (Toronto 2007: 49). In particular, “national military academies focus on educating 
future officers in the skills and knowledge they will need to perform their duties” (Toronto 2017: 
859). Dornbusch (1955) describes military academies as assimilating institutions, which draw 
recruits into the military’s common “cultural life” and create a set of shared memories and 
attitudes. Military academies exist in both developed and less developed countries, in democracies 
and authoritarian states, but arguably the most prominent examples are in the Western world and 
include Sandhurst in the UK, Saint Cyr in France, or West Point in the US.1 These institutions are 
strongly linked to the professionalization of armed forces. In Lebanon, for instance, army officers 
regard the military academy as the “school of the nation,” where officer cadets transcend sectarian 
identities (Moussa 2016).2 This link between professionalism and military academies explains why 
many countries in the world have indeed created such schools: to improve structure and 
																																								 																				
1 Military academies differ from other military educational institutions. Contrary to war colleges, military academies 
aim to educate cadets who just entered the military rather than mid-level officers to enable them to take on general 
staff duties. They also aim at training future officers, not non-commissioned officers or enlisted personnel.  
2 See also Guyot (1987: 4) on the Philippine academy or Jowell (2014: 287) on the Rwandan military school. 
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performance, as well as to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces. But despite 
the obvious beneficial implications associated with military academies, we suggest that there can 
also be a negative side effect stemming from such institutions.3 
Consider July 15, 2016, when a faction of the Turkish military tried to overthrow Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s government. The coup plotters eventually failed to capture (or kill) Erdoğan, but had to 
face other segments of the military and citizens loyal to the regime who rapidly took to the streets.4 
Erdoğan’s response to the failed coup attempt was quick and forceful: thousands of people were 
arrested or purged, including judges, teachers, police officers, civil servants, as well as numerous 
military officers and other personnel. Importantly, only a few days after the putsch attempt, on 
July 31, the Turkish government announced that it would close all military academies in the 
country.5 The Turkish military has traditionally perceived itself as a protector and guarantor of 
Kemalism. And, in fact, military academies are the key channel through which officers are 
socialized into Atatürk’s principles. By taking advantage of its weakness after the failed attempt, 
Erdoğan thus may have sought to eliminate a traditional source of ideological opposition and to 
put the armed forces under more direct control of the government to forestall potential future 
coups. 
																																								 																				
3 At the same time, note that military academies do not constitute the only model for educating officers. Instead of 
entering the military through separate military academies, future officers may be promoted from the rank and file. 
Barnett (1967), for example, contrasts the military academy model of educating future military officers with the 
German model (especially after World War I) where future officers did not train in separate military academies but 
together with soldiers from the rank and file. Israel is a commonly cited model, where, in the past, officers of the 
ground forces were mostly recruited only after having acquired experience as non-commissioned officers or squad 
leaders in combat units during their compulsory military service (Cohen 1995; Bar-Or and Shay 2005). 
4 Patrick Kingsley and Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Military coup attempted in Turkey against Erdoğan government,” The 
Guardian, available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/15/turkey-coup-attempt-military-ankara-
istanbul. 
5 “Turkey to shut military academies as it targets armed forces for ‘cleansing’,” The Guardian, available online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/31/turkey-to-shut-military-academies-as-it-targets-armed-forces-for-
cleansing. 
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But what are the precise mechanisms behind the relationship of military academies and coups? 
Is there systematic evidence for the presence of military academies increasing the risk of a coup? 
And how do contextual factors such as regime type potentially moderate such an effect? The 
Turkish case highlights the importance of investigating the institutions and characteristics of 
military professionalism and how they could facilitate the staging of a coup d’état. However, the 
role of academies remains largely unexplored. Previous work identified a number of factors that 
influence the military’s disposition and capacity to stage a coup. Concerning motives, key 
influences include structural variables capturing governments’ legitimacy crises and political 
instability, or the military’s grievances and the defense of its (unmet) corporate interests (e.g., 
Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 1977; Londregan and Poole 1990; Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000; 
Belkin and Schofer 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Thyne 2010; Roessler 2011; Powell 2012; 
Leon 2014; Bell and Sudduth 2017).  
The study of the factors driving the capacity to coordinate a putsch is more limited. Thompson 
(1976) stresses the role of organizational cohesion, using the involvement of senior officers in 
coups as a proxy. However, he does not directly identify what spurs cohesion and allows officers 
to coordinate in the first place. Thus, scholars have mostly focused on obstacles that hinder 
coordination such as international conflict (Arbatli and Arbatli 2016; Piplani and Talmadge 2016), 
the size of the military (Powell 2012), and, especially, structural coup-proofing strategies (e.g., 
Feaver 1999; Quinlivan 1999). Some find that counterbalancing, entailing the fragmentation of the 
security forces into multiple military and paramilitary units, reduces coup risk (Belkin and Schofer 
2003; Powell 2012; Böhmelt and Pilster 2016; Albrecht and Eibl 2018; but also, De Bruin 2017).  
Previous works have difficulties in identifying organizational factors that shape a military’s 
preferences and facilitate coordination. This research fills this gap by focusing on the impact of 
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military academies on the risk of coup attempts. First, in an unconditional setup, we argue that 
military academies may increase the risk of coups through two mechanisms. On one hand, 
education through academies creates, inculcates, and strengthens a set of cohesive and shared 
preferences, views, and corporate identity amongst military personnel, which could go against the 
actions, policies, or ideas of incumbent governments. On the other hand, academies contribute to 
establish and foster networks of trust among military officers. Such trust-based relationships, in 
turn, facilitate coordination and the revelation of information, both necessary for plotting and 
executing a coup. Second, we also develop an argument for a conditional hypothesis. In 
democracies, military schools may emphasize more the importance of civilian control of militaries 
and the norm against military intervention in politics as core principles underlying democratic 
institutions. In dictatorships, leaders are more likely to pursue particularistic interests, and have 
stronger incentives to limit the autonomy of the military and interfere in promotion and recruitment 
practices. Additionally, the secrecy and trust that personal networks enable become all the more 
important for successful plotting in more repressive contexts. This implies that the negative side 
effects of military academies might be more pronounced in non-democracies. Using global data 
on coup attempts and military academies for the period 1950 to 2004, our results show that military 
schools significantly increase the risk of coups d’état, but that this effect is mostly significant in 
non-democratic regimes.  
Despite their clear benefits for improving militaries’ performance and effectiveness, by 
showing the potential negative side effects of military academies, we are the first to point to 
previously unknown implications for our understanding of how civil-military relations work. 
Concretely, we contribute new insights on military education and professionalization, which will 
be crucial for policymakers and scholars alike, as we suggest that military academies can be 
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important vehicles through which coups emerge, especially in non-democratic regimes. Hence, 
while our research underlines that Western states should take great care when establishing military 
schools in less democratic or democratizing states, academies like Sandhurst, Saint Cyr, or West 
Point are unlikely to constitute a threat for democratic survival or to increase coup risk in their 
respective, established democratic countries. 
The next section reviews the literature on the general relationship between military 
professionalism and civil-military relations. We then develop our unconditional theoretical 
argument in two steps, before developing the claim that regime type moderates the impact of 
military academies on coup risk. After describing the data, variables, and methods, we discuss the 
main findings. The final section concludes and discusses the research’s implications for both 
policymakers and future studies.  
 
Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations 
There are two general views about the relationship between military professionalism and civil-
military relations. On one hand, Huntington (1957) defines military professionalism as the armed 
forces being “a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics,” focused 
on the management of violence and maintaining control over their own education and promotion 
systems. Importantly, Huntington (1957: 71-78) hypothesizes that professionalism would render 
the military politically neutral and prevent it from intervening in politics: “the participation of 
military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional 
competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for 
professional values.”6 On the other hand, Finer (1962: 20-26) argues that military professionalism 
																																								 																				
6 This contrasts with Janowitz’s (1960) definition of a professional constabulary force characterized by an officer 
corps that is integrated with civil values and politically aware.  
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might push officers toward intervening in politics in opposition to the incumbent government. He 
outlines three mechanisms: professionalism makes the military to perceive itself as serving a more 
abstract notion of the state as opposed to the government currently in power; a sense of 
professionalism pushes the military into confrontations with the incumbent over recruitment, 
promotion, or equipment issues; and, finally, professionalism creates a desire in the military to 
avoid being used in oppressing domestic opponents.7 
Scholars have correspondingly sought to unpack professionalism into its various elements to 
shed more light on this apparent contradiction. Stepan (1973), for instance, claims that 
professionalization in the armed forces may orient them around internal (i.e., political stability and 
development) or external threats (i.e., other states). A military whose professionalism is defined 
vis-à-vis internal dangers is then more likely to intervene in politics. Nordlinger (1977) 
distinguishes between three dimensions of military professionalism: autonomy from civilian 
interference, exclusiveness as the sole armed force in a country, and expertise in the administration 
of violence. The effect of expertise, the dimension most relevant to our research, on the military’s 
propensity to intervene in politics is not clearly identified, though. On one hand, a focus on the 
acquisition of military expertise may keep the armed forces away from intervening in politics. On 
the other hand, military officers could be tempted to transfer parts of their expertise, such as 
managerial skills, into civilian governance, thus increasing coup risk. Also, expertness usually 
increases their power and capacity vis-à-vis the government.  
																																								 																				
7 Similarly, Bellin (2004: 145, 2012) contends that institutionalized militaries, as opposed to patrimonialized ones, 
tend to be “rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic,” with “established paths of career advancement and 
recruitment” and with a corporate identity separate from the regime. Moreover, “under these conditions, the military 
elite will be able to imagine separation from the regime and life beyond the regime” (Bellin 2012: 133), which may 
lead them to oppose the government. 
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Other studies investigate the effects of military education on civil-military relations. Quinlivan 
(1999: 151ff) argues that the introduction of military educational systems, including military 
academies, in Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Iraq has served as a coup-proofing device: “[i]mproving the 
technical skills of regular military officers increases […] their sense of the military risks involved 
in a coup attempt […]. The very dependence of technically skilled officers on the creation of 
detailed plans and their coordination opens the conspirators to active measures by the security 
forces.” Similarly, Ruby and Gibler (2010: 359) contend that US training of foreign officers 
“encourages political stability and a democratization of foreign militaries.” By altering the 
attitudes of foreign military officers to the extent that they accept civilian superiority in civil-
military relations, we should expect a reduction in coup risk. In a more recent analysis, Savage and 
Caverley (2017) arrive at a different conclusion: foreign-trained officers can draw upon their newly 
acquired military skills, know how to frame and politically justify a potential coup attempt in a 
way acceptable to the US, and have influence and prestige resulting from foreign training, which 
they can use to mobilize fellow soldiers. Foreign training can thus increase coup risk. 
Several aspects seem important against this background. First, military academies are strongly 
linked to the professionalism of the armed forces, and this is why many countries in the world have 
created such institutions. Figure 1 underlines this by showing the maximum number of military 
academies in any year for all countries in the world since 1950. Obviously, military academies 
exist in many states, and they are not confined to only a few geographical areas or nations. 
However, secondly, how professionalism and, particularly, military academies are related to and 
affect civil-military relations remains understudied. We contribute to this debate by first discussing 
two causal mechanisms linking academies to coup risk: preferences and coordination. Further, we 
also argue that that the negative side effects of military academies are more pronounced in non-
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democracies, i.e., military academies are likely to exert diverse effects across different forms of 
government. 
__________ 
Figure 1 
__________ 
 
An Unconditional Effect of Military Academies: Views, Beliefs, and Networks of Trust 
Rationalist approaches posit that coups are the result of two general mechanisms shaping the 
expected utility and, hence, the perceived probability of success of attempts: the military’s motives 
(or willingness) for intervening, which determine the expected payoff of seizing power and, 
secondly, the opportunities (or constraints) plotters face when coordinating and acting collectively 
(e.g., Sutter 2000; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Thyne 2010; Powell 2012; Böhmelt, Pilster, and Tago 
2017). In a first, unconditional argument, we contend that military academies may increase the 
risk of a coup attempt by influencing both of these factors. 
On one hand, mirroring Finer (1962), military academies may affect officers’ disposition to plot 
coups. Academies are central in the formation and transmission of shared beliefs, cohesive 
preferences, and norms held by military officers. As Toronto (2017: 859-860) notes, academies 
“instill in the officer corps a sense of duty and loyalty to the state or to society.” Such identities 
and values can be transmitted independently from the sitting government. Militaries that run 
academies possess a higher capacity for autonomously instilling corporate values and preferences, 
as well as for transmitting specific doctrines in officers’ belief systems. Under such circumstances, 
tensions and confrontations with incumbent governments over corporate interests or even political 
values are more likely to emerge. First, military socialization strengthens corporate consciousness, 
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which “implies a concern with the maintenance of hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness within 
the military; autonomy from civilian intervention in postings and promotions; and budgets 
sufficient to attract high-quality recruits and buy state-of-the-art weapons” (Geddes 2003: 54). 
Such preferences may raise confrontations with the incumbent government when the latter’s 
actions encroach on the military’s corporate interests and autonomy (Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 
1977).  
Second, military academies may also increase officers’ political consciousness by instilling 
specific political values and doctrines that define a more politically active self-perceived mission 
and role for the military.8 For example, a core principle of the Turkish Military Academy guiding 
the education of their members is: “[c]adets are to develop service awareness and profession of 
arms with respect to Atatürk’s principles and reforms, Atatürk nationalism, principles of 
democratic, secular, social constitutional state in the framework of Kemalist Thought System.”9 
The ideological preferences and actions of several Turkish governments have been interpreted as 
threats to secularism and democracy. And indeed, the preservation of Kemalism was invoked by 
military officers to justify the 1960, 1971, and 1980 coups. Additionally, some school-transmitted 
doctrines gear officers toward intervention in political life. For example, Stepan (1971, 1973) 
claims that academies in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, e.g., those in Brazil, 
Argentina, and Uruguay, promoted a new doctrine of national security, which advocated an active 
and expanded political role of the army that led, for instance, to the 1964 coup in Brazil. Related 
to this, some suggest that education and training in academies may foster a sense of moral and 
																																								 																				
8 As Rouquié and Suffern (1998: 151) stress, “[t]he new armies’ civic and national responsibilities, and the 
independence enjoyed by their officers, hardly predisposed them to remain politically silent. Those who had believed 
that professionalization would guarantee an apolitical military were to be proven sorely wrong. Soldiers do not easily 
remain politically neutral when they find themselves heavily engaged in nation and state-building tasks and charged 
with important internal defense functions.” 
9 Available online at: http://www.kho.edu.tr/eng_about_tma/mission.html. 
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even intellectual superiority among officers (Nunn 1972, 1975). The military might well perceive 
itself as serving more superior values as opposed to the government’s partisan and narrower goals 
(Finer 1962), thereby feeling skilled, competent, and compelled (as patriotic saviors) to intervene 
to redress undesirable situations brought about by “corrupt” civilian politicians (Nordlinger 1977). 
Beliefs, preferences, and norms may differ significantly in countries where officers have not been 
educated in a military academy, but instead train with the rank and file. Note, for instance, Ben 
Shalom’s (2014: 52-53) analysis of officer education in the Israeli Defense Forces and its officer 
corps’ value system: “[t]he Israeli combat officer is first and foremost a combat soldier rather than 
an officer operating according to professional military ethics […]. Combat officers operate 
according to informal, rather than professionalized, traditions. These traditions are shaped by 
specific missions and weapons systems, rather than through membership in an institutionalized 
officer corps with a unique code of ethics […]. Unlike other professional militaries in the west, 
this profile expresses a widespread Israeli ethos, rather than a military ethic that is separate from 
society.” 
Education in military academies spurs cohesiveness, making it more likely that a sufficient 
number of officers decide to intervene to defend or preserve their corporate interests or political 
principles when deemed to be under threat. As Stepan (1973) puts it, a “[m]ilitary unity […] is 
strongest when one of its central principles, such as military discipline, is threatened from the 
outside.” And in Geddes’ words (2003: 54), “most officers agree to join coup conspiracies only 
when they believe that the civilian government prevents the achievement of their main goals.” 
Academies, in sum, contribute to define and inculcate such principles and goals.  
On the other hand, military academies increase officers’ ability to plan and execute a coup. 
Specialized schools not only improve the skills and operational capacity of the armed forces 
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(Savage and Caverley 2017), but also create networks that facilitate coordination. Indeed, 
coordination is a critical requirement in the planning and implementation of a coup (Geddes 1999; 
Böhmelt and Pilster 2016; Böhmelt, Pilster, and Tago 2017). Participants in contentious collective 
action usually face a high risk of discovery and punishment. Plotting demands secrecy and trust. 
To avoid detection, to reveal their (true) preferences to other potential conspirators, to bring 
enough participation into the plot, to coordinate their actions, and to maximize their chances of 
success, individuals engaged in different forms of contentious collective action need to strongly 
depend on others they trust. As a result, mobilization for such endeavors often relies on pre-existent 
personal networks that do create strong ties and relations of trust (e.g., Siegel 2009; Snow, Zurcher, 
and Ekland-Olson 1980).10  
Petersen (2001: 16ff) posits that “strong communities” are central for the communication and 
recruitment processes that underlie any rebellion. Political entrepreneurs attempting to organize 
for fighting the government usually face a state that has infiltrated the population with its 
informers. The incumbent also attempts to block communication between different segments of 
the society that may mobilize against the government. In this context, direct, multi-dimensional, 
reciprocal relations based on shared beliefs and values, a characteristic of “strong communities,” 
allow for organization. Such strong communities make individuals to overcome collective action 
problems through norms of reciprocity, status rewards, social monitoring within the community, 
and by facilitating threshold calculations (Petersen 2001). With regard to the latter, community 
																																								 																				
10 For an analysis of the role of networks in military defections during the Syrian conflict, see Koehler, Ohl, and 
Albrecht (2016). Gould’s (1991) study of the 1871’s uprising of the “Commune of Paris” demonstrates that 
mobilization was, among others, based on pre-existing social networks. In her study of militant female Palestinian 
networks in 1980s Lebanon, Parkinson (2013) shows how important trust-based quotidian networks were for 
mobilization, especially once the Israeli counterinsurgents had severed formal command and control structures. 
Finally, Staniland (2014: 23ff) argues that insurgent organizations are built on the basis of their leaders’ pre-existing 
social networks. In nascent insurgent groups, leaders have to appropriate already existent networks during a time of 
state repression and uncertainty over the organization’s persistence.  
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norms allow individuals to form beliefs about the number of individuals likely to participate in a 
rebellion, thus facilitating the assessment whether they can find “safety in numbers” against state 
repression. 
Just like an insurgency, a military coup is a high-risk endeavor marred by the various problems 
faced in the organization of contentious collective action. We argue that the necessary networks 
and bonds that aid coordination among coup-plotters are likely to be established and emerge during 
the years of training in military academies. Although some officers may share a preference for 
intervening, initial disaffected plotters still need to approach and share their views and intentions 
with other fellow officers with the aim of persuading and mobilizing them. During the planning 
phase, the core group of conspirators then needs to ensure the participation of core military units, 
preferably those stationed in or around the capital. At the same time, conspirators must avoid the 
scrutiny of the government’s security services that are, especially in coup-prone countries, usually 
on the watch-out for disloyal officers (Nordlinger 1977: 100; Singh 2014: 108-109). Recruitment 
is thus risky, with detection possibly resulting in arrest, dismissal, the loss of military rank, or 
worse. As Luttwak (2016: 80) emphasizes, the natural calculus of an officer approached to 
participate in a coup would be to report it to government authorities. 
In light of this, consider the role of military academies. Prospective officers attend military 
schools at the beginning of their careers. The time in the military academy is the first – and likely 
most defining − part of officer cadets’ “institutional lives,” during which their identity as a 
professional soldier is systematically built up in order to transcend other social or ethnic identities 
(Janowitz 1977: 146-147). Pre-existing networks of trust between officers are central for solving 
the problem of whom coup plotters can approach for two reasons. First, shared beliefs and values 
transmitted during training make it less difficult for plotters to approach and persuade other fellow 
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officers into action (or acquiescence) as they are more likely to share a similar view on current 
circumstances – as outlined with our first argument. Second, such networks allow plotters to 
communicate their plans securely to other officers without risking being betrayed (Luttwak 2016). 
As Singh (2014: 108-109) emphasizes, “conspiracies therefore evolve where members of the 
military already trust each other, such as among members of the same training cohort or officers 
who have served together.”  
The collective action problem does not cease once plotters have shared their views, convinced 
other officers, and agreed to proceed with action, however. Once underway, military coups can be 
understood as coordination games between different factions within the military (Geddes 1999; 
Singh 2014; Böhmelt and Pilster 2016): while soldiers may prefer different coup outcomes, they 
usually share an interest in preserving cohesion and preventing fratricidal conflict between 
different units of the armed forces. Geddes (2003: 54) notes here that “the most important concern 
for many officers in deciding whether to join a coup conspiracy is their assessment of how many 
other officers will join.” These considerations, in turn, raise the importance of belief formation 
about the behavior of other soldiers.11 A shared set of beliefs and personal connections influence 
officers’ threshold calculations, i.e., their expectations of how others and their units (and how 
many) may act during a coup, which reduces uncertainty and facilitates coordination. As expressed 
by an officer interviewed for Moussa’s (2016) study on the Lebanese officer corps, “[w]hen the 
army split during the civil war [in 1989-1990], there was no gunfire or genocide between the two 
armies. Officers who graduate the same year cannot shoot at each other.”  
In sum, since military coups are instances of high-risk contentious collective action, the officers 
planning and conducting a coup need to rely on networks of trusted officers. Military academies 
																																								 																				
11 In Singh’s (2014: 21) words, “the most important consideration in an actor’s decision calculus is to support the side 
he believes everybody else will support, and military strength flows accordingly to that side.” 
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are usually one, if not the central location, where future officers form a “cohesive body” (Barnett 
1967: 22) and relationships of trust (Siebold 2007). For officer cadets, the time in the military 
academy typically constitutes a time of intense bonding, creating life-long ties of trust (Dornbusch 
1955), which are fungible for collective action, more generally, and for the plotting and executing 
military coups in particular. Stepan (1971: 53), for example, shows that the core of the “free 
officers” who plotted the 1949 coup in Egypt were all part of the very first class of the Egyptian 
military academy in 1936. Similarly, the core group of officers staging the 1981 coup in Thailand 
was part of the same class in the Chulachomklao Military Academy (Chandra and Kammen 2002: 
118-119). And the 1991 coup was led by officers from the academy’s Class 5 (Pathmanand 2008: 
125). Based on these two mechanisms, i.e., that military academies can inculcate and strengthen 
cohesive views and that these schools establish networks among military officers that facilitate 
coordination, our unconditional argument suggests:  
Unconditional Military Academy-Coup Hypothesis: Military academies increase the likelihood 
that a country experiences a coup d’état. 
 
A Conditional Effect of Military Academies: Regime Types 
We also argue for and empirically test a conditional hypothesis: the theory assumes so far that 
contextual factors do not influence what impact military academies might have on coup risk. Yet, 
there are several reasons to expect the positive effect of academies on coup risk to be more 
pronounced in non-democracies. First, civil-military conflict may be more likely to emerge under 
authoritarian rule (see also Pilster and Böhmelt 2012). Military academies could instill future 
officers with a shared set of beliefs, preferences, and norms, independent of whether they are 
situated in a democratic or an authoritarian state. However, tensions with incumbent governments 
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over the military’s corporate interests or values seem to be more likely to emerge in autocratic 
forms of government. On one hand, authoritarian governments are more like to clash with the 
military’s self-perception of serving a more general and abstract notion of the state and society 
(Finer 1962; Bellin 2012). Compared to democratic polities, authoritarian regimes are more likely 
to embody narrow or particularistic interests (ethnic or ideological) and make use of corrupt and 
repressive practices. This military’s obligation to primarily defend the public and national interests 
− and not a (non-representative) regime’s – is especially put to test when the regime calls on the 
military to repress domestic opposition and crush popular protests. As Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and 
Grisham (2014: 234) argue, “[m]issions that are, in the military’s mind, professionally degrading 
or otherwise incompatible with the military’s raison d’être are ones they prefer not undertaking.” 
This raises the risk of officers shifting their support from the regime to the opposition and, hence, 
may increase the likelihood of coups.  
On the other hand, elites in authoritarian states have stronger incentives to engage in coup-
proofing, a move that may actually trigger civil-military conflict (Sudduth 2017). Due to its 
capacity for violence and organized action, the military poses a threat to the survival of incumbent 
regimes (Svolik 2012; McMahon and Slantchev 2015).12 However, this threat is more pronounced 
in authoritarian states than in democratic ones. Successful coups d’état are less likely in democratic 
states with their mass political participation and agreed-upon formulas for political change and 
transfers of power (Pilster and Böhmelt 2012). On the contrary, incentives to capture power 
through a coup are higher in non-democratic regimes. Autocratic leaders fearing for their power, 
in turn, may undermine professionalism, and encroach on the military’s corporate interests and 
organizational autonomy. Measures such as purges, promotion based on loyalty or personal links, 
																																								 																				
12 Indeed, coups have been the most common way through which autocratic leaders and regimes have been deposed 
(Svolik 2012). 
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rotations, discretionary appointments, parallel chains of command, and ethnic staking can cause 
sharp confrontations with the incumbent over hierarchy, recruitment, and promotion (e.g., 
Horowitz 1985; Feaver 1999; Quinlivan 1999; Roessler 2011; Sudduth 2017).  
Second, personal networks of trust among military officers are scarcer under more repressive 
regimes. This, in turn, could enhance the importance of the networks military academies inevitably 
create. Not only the risk of detection is higher in non-democracies due to the intense scrutiny of 
the regime, but so is the severity of punishment. Also, autocrats actively seek to hinder 
coordination within the armed forces not only by undermining hierarchy and creating parallel 
chains of command (Böhmelt and Pilster 2016), but also by using infiltrated personnel, informers, 
military internal intelligence units, and political commissariats (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982; 
Barany 1991). Under such conditions, an atmosphere of mistrust may easily spread among officers. 
The trust that networks created in military academies provide become all the more necessary and 
critical for the successful plotting and execution of a coup under autocracy 
In addition to these two channels, another mechanism specific to democracies further 
contributes to the impact of academies being less significant under democracy. According to 
Stepan (1988: 143), “[w]here the military is a part of the state apparatus and has a markedly 
different idea about the nature of democratic politics and the legitimate role of the military than 
that held by the leaders of the government, this can be a major source of intrastate division. The 
executive team of the state apparatus will then, at some time, have to play an active role in 
monitoring and reshaping military resocialization.” One possibility is to close academies such as 
Turkey’s Erdoğan announced and the executive did with ESEDENA in post-transition Uruguay 
(Stepan 1988: 143). Also, some civilian state authorities may try to influence military academies 
and their teaching. As Janowitz (1960) would suggest, it seems plausible that military education 
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in democracies may seek to convey the norm against military intervention in politics in their 
teaching and practices. Similarly, Huntington (1957) posited that professionalism would foster 
political neutrality of the military.  In detail, while the military, as an enduring institution, might 
not necessarily adjust to the regime type of the current government in place, and what is being 
taught at military educational institutions rather reflects the military’s ideology and self-
understanding, it seems likely that how and what is being taught might differ across regimes. As 
discussed above, Ruby and Gibler (2010: 359), among others, demonstrate that the US’s academy 
teaching focuses on conveying democratic values to its cadets. In light of this, the impact of 
military academies could well differ across democratic and non-democratic states. In general, 
democracies are usually characterized by civilian control of the military and the norm against 
military intervention in politics, and it seems plausible that military academies in some 
democracies may convey these core principles underlying democratic political institutions in their 
teaching and practices. We conclude in light of this discussion that the role of military academies, 
what is being taught at these institutions, and to what extent the state influences or monitors this, 
seems likely to differ across democratic and non-democratic forms of government (see also Stepan 
1971).  
Conditional Military Academy-Coup Hypothesis: The effect of military academies on coup risk 
varies by regime type. 
 
Data and Research Design 
Data and Dependent Variable 
We analyze monadic time-series cross-sectional data that have the country-year as the unit of 
analysis. The temporal domain is 1950 to 2004 due to the limited data availability of our main 
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explanatory variable on military academies. That said, other explanatory factors (that we describe 
in the following) have an even more limited availability, which decreases the temporal coverage 
in some of our estimations to 1970-2004. The dependent variable is based on Powell and Thyne’s 
(2011) data set on coups. A coup attempt is defined as an “attempt by the military or other elites 
within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of government using unconstitutional means” 
(Powell and Thyne 2011: 249ff). Following Powell (2012: 1026), we created a binary coup 
variable in 1950-2004 that receives a value of 1 if at least one attempt was made in a year (0 
otherwise). Out of the 7,909 country-years in our data between 1950 and 2004, 381 (4.82 percent) 
are coded as 1. Since Coup Attempt is binary, we use logistic regression models. To control for 
temporal dependencies in the likelihood of coups, we follow Carter and Signorino’s (2010) cubic 
polynomial approximation based on the number of years elapsed since the last attempt (if any). 
Standard errors are clustered by country to control for intra-group correlations such as 
idiosyncratic path dependencies of states over time. 
 
Explanatory Variables and Control Items 
Our main explanatory variable is based on the number of active military academies in a given 
country-year, as coded by Toronto (2017). As indicated above, he defines military academies as 
any military school (i.e., army, navy, air force, and other branches) graduating cadets to 
commissions. The main data sources for this compilation are Heyman (2002), Keegan (1983), and 
secondary (historical) sources including individual states’ defense ministries and military 
websites. To minimize the potential for bias related	to coding error, we use a dichotomous measure 
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of this item. In our sample, the variable has a mean value of 0.744 and a standard deviation of 
0.437.13  
__________ 
Figure 2 
__________ 
Specifically, about three percent of our sample countries have never established a military 
academy (e.g., Albania), while 50 states (e.g., the US) in our sample (45 percent) have had at least 
one academy over the entire observation period. This leaves us with about 50 percent of countries 
in our sample that display variation in the establishment of military academies, i.e., there is an 
academy in some years, but not in others. The general spatio-temporal trends in our main 
explanatory variable are summarized in Figure 2, which depicts the average degree of established 
military schools by regions over time. A level of 1, for example, means that all countries in a 
particular region have had a military academy in a specific year. In the appendix, we summarize 
models that omit those countries that always/never had a military academy and estimations based 
on a purely cross-sectional sample. 
For the conditional hypothesis, we estimate models where we specify an interaction of Military 
Academy with variables on regime type. To this end, we create two regime type variables: 
Autocracy and Democracy, with anocracies as the reference category. We employ data from the 
Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2004) and define democracies as those countries scoring 
a value of +6 or higher on the polity2 scale. Autocracies receive a value of -6 or lower in a specific 
year. As coups are generally less likely to break out in democracies than autocracies or anocracies, 
we use Autocracy and Democracy as controls in the unconditional models, but interact them with 
																																								 																				
13 The appendix presents alternative models using the count of military academies. 
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Military Academy for the test of the conditional hypothesis. For a final set of models, we divide 
our sample into democratic, autocratic, and anocratic country-years to examine whether the impact 
of military academies varies by regime type. 
In light of previous work (e.g., Powell 2012; Böhmelt and Pilster 2016; Albrecht and Eibl 2018), 
we consider several alternative determinants of coups. Some of these controls could also correlate 
with the establishment of military academies, e.g., it seems plausible that particularly states with 
a strong military are more likely to have created military schools. And, in fact, our analysis in the 
appendix presents evidence for this, highlighting that it seems unlikely that military schools are 
randomly distributed across countries. First, good economic conditions raise the legitimacy of the 
ruling regime, making it less likely that there is demand for an irregular change in government and 
leadership. We include two variables to control for this. One captures the percent year-to-year 
change in GDP per capita, a second is the lagged and logged income (GDP per capita) level per 
year. Both variables are based on real income data in 2005 prices.  
Second, challenges to the regime may not only emerge due to economic factors, but also 
political ones. We thus control for the overall level of political instability in a country as captured 
by the Banks’ (2001) Instability index. This variable comprises information on assassinations, 
purging of governmental officials, guerrilla activity, protests, riots, and strikes (see also Powell 
2012: 1028). The variable we use is both lagged and logged. 
Third, we control with three variables for the strength of the military: Military Personnel, which 
is logged and lagged by one year, measures the size of a country’s armed forces as coded by the 
Correlates of War Project. Additionally, we include states’ expenditure level per soldier (Soldier 
Quality, lagged and logged) and annual changes therein (Change Military Expenditure). For these 
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three variables, we follow the operationalization in Powell (2012), but use updated versions due 
to the larger period of time in our data set. 
Finally, we control for institutional coup-proofing or counterbalancing using the variable on the 
effective number of ground-combat compatible forces in Pilster and Böhmelt (2011, 2012). We 
also take into account the squared term of this variable in our estimations to model the likely 
curvilinear impact on the likelihood of a coup (Böhmelt and Pilster 2016). Both variables, 
Counterbalancing and Counterbalancing2, are lagged by one year.  
Table 1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of all variables discussed so far. The last 
column reports the variance inflation factors.   
__________ 
Table 1 
__________ 
 
Empirical Results 
The models of our analysis for the unconditional hypothesis are summarized in Table 2, which 
presents three estimations. The first focuses on our core variable of interest only; while temporal 
controls are included, we omit the other explanatory variables discussed above. The second model 
includes most controls next to Military Academy and the variables for temporal autocorrelation, 
but we omit the counterbalancing variables as data for them are only available as of 1970. 
Including Counterbalancing and its square term then limits our period under study significantly, 
as shown in Model 3 where the number of observations is notably lower. The entries in Table 2 
are regular logit coefficients and, thus, only their signs and significance levels allow for a direct 
interpretation. Substantive quantities of interest are summarized in Figure 3, where we plot the 
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changes in the coup probabilities for a switch of Military Academy from 0 to 1 while holding all 
other variables constant at their medians. Table 5 presents the control variables’ first differences, 
i.e., percentage-point changes in the predicted probability of a coup. Finally, the models for the 
conditional hypothesis are presented in Table 4: Model 4 comprises the interaction of Military 
Academy with the regime-type items, while Models 5-7 focus on sub-samples of democracies, 
autocracies, and anocracies, respectively. As the multiplicative specification in Model 4 cannot be 
directly interpreted, Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities of coup risk given the (non-) 
establishment of military academies in either democracies or autocracies. 
__________ 
Table 2 and Figure 3 
__________ 
Models 1-3 support our first, unconditional hypothesis. Consider the area under the precision-
recall (PR) curve and the expected proportional reduction in error. The former is based on an in-
sample prediction approach, and ranges from a low value of 0.0 if there is no improvement in 
predictive power over a random guess to 1.0 for perfect classifications of outcomes. With regard 
to our core variable of interest, compare the PR-curve statistics and the reductions in error for 
Model 1 and Model 3. While the full model achieves a reasonably high PR score of 0.210, Model 
1 shows that this is primarily driven by Military Academy as all other controls (except those 
capturing temporal dependencies) are omitted from the estimation, but the PR score is already at 
0.145. Similarly, Model 1 is “responsible” for a reduction in error of about 0.05 alone, while Model 
3 is characterized by a value of 0.109 here. All this indicates that Military Academy substantially 
improves in-sample predictive power. The predicted proportional reduction in error further 
supports this conclusion. In terms of the coefficient, as expected, Military Academy is positively 
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signed and statistically significant at conventional levels. Therefore, while military academies may 
improve the professionalism of the armed forces, they can produce a negative externality. In 
substantive terms, changing Military Academy from 0 to 1, the simulated risk of a coup is raised 
by about 1.8 percentage points on average across Models 1-3. For Model 1, the first-difference 
point estimate is at 1.47 percentage points (90 percent confidence interval in [0.006; 0.024]), while 
we obtain estimates of 2.3 percentage points (interval in [0.011; 0.036]) and 1.60 percentage points 
(interval in [0.005; 0.029]) in Model 2 and Model 3, respectively. 
__________ 
Table 3 
__________ 
Our argument underlying the unconditional hypothesis emphasizes that officers develop shared 
ideas and norms in academies that could challenge incumbent leaders. A second mechanism 
suggests that experiences at military academies build and foster networks among officers that then 
allow coordinating the organization of a coup more effectively. Given this rationale, there might 
be a temporal lag between when officers actually attend military academies and when a coup is 
attempted (see Singh 2014). In a similar vein, some countries abolish their academies after some 
years, but the networks created there should persist; in any event, after officers leave the military 
academy, those mechanisms we argue for should prevail. Therefore, we examine different lag 
structures for the main variable, Military Academy.14 For instance, coups from the middle of the 
military hierarchy make up the vast majority of coups (Singh 2014), but, at a minimum, about ten 
years might be necessary for an individual who graduated from a military academy to be promoted 
																																								 																				
14 Ideally, we would require data on whether military officers who are currently (at least) in the middle-ranked 
positions had attended military academies when they started their careers. Unfortunately, we lack such disaggregated 
data. 
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to a position where he can take a leadership role in coordinating with other military officers in key 
positions to succeed in a putsch. And even in developing countries, becoming a battalion 
commander (usually associated with the rank of lieutenant colonel) requires at least 15 years after 
graduation. In light of these patterns, the non-existence of a military academy in a current year 
may not fully capture that military officers have low abilities and motivations to attempt a coup. 
We thus re-estimated Model 2 with different temporal lags for Military Academy. Table 3 
summarizes the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and significance levels for Military Academy 
at these different temporal lags.15 But as demonstrated there, the positive and significant effect of 
Military Academy prevails at any temporal lag specified. 
__________ 
Table 4 and Figure 4 
__________ 
Coming to the conditional hypothesis suggesting that the impact of military academies on coup 
risk differs by regime type, we specify an interaction of Military Academy with Democracy and 
Autocracy, respectively. In addition, we also study different sub-samples of our data: autocracies 
only, democracies only, and anocracies only as defined by the binary regime-type variables. First, 
Military Academy still exerts a positive and significant effect on coup attempts even when 
including interactions with Democracy and Autocracy in Model 4. To allow for a more direct 
interpretation, we plot predicted probabilities for the core scenarios of the multiplicative 
specification in Figure 4. As demonstrated there, the significant effect holds for autocracies 
(anocracies as the baseline category) since the points estimates for Military Academy=0 and 
Military Academy=1 are statistically different from each other and, (b) the estimate of the latter is 
																																								 																				
15 Control variables are included, but not reported for this table. 
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also significantly different from Military Academy=1 in the case of democracies (as the confidence 
intervals do not overlap in either case). However, the effect stemming from military academies 
seems to be more weakly pronounced in democratic states: although the predicted probability of a 
coup increases when moving from 0 to 1 for Military Academy, the two scenarios’ confidence 
intervals do overlap in the case of democracies. 
Second, we further examine this by re-estimating Model 2 for the regime sub-samples in our 
data. As can be seen in Models 5-7, the unconditional effect of Military Academy identified above 
is particularly driven by non-democratic regimes: autocracies and anocracies. Mirroring what we 
report in Figure 4, the coefficient estimate of Military Academy is statistically insignificant for the 
democracy-only sub-sample. Ultimately, this suggests that the negative externality stemming from 
those institutions is most strongly pronounced in non-democratic states (see also Stepan 1971). 
However, note that it cannot be derived from these findings that military academies reduce coup 
risk in democracies. In fact, neither is the finding pertaining to democracies negative nor is it 
statistically significant in any estimation. As such, military academies do not reduce coup risk in 
democratic regimes, but it seems they merely do not significantly affect the likelihood of a coup. 
While this supports our conditional hypothesis as the effect of Military Academy does differ across 
forms of government, the insignificant finding for democracies can be explained along the 
following lines. As discussed, what is being taught at military academies may not be directly driven 
by whether the current regime in power is a democracy or not. The military, as an enduring 
institution, does not necessarily adjust to the regime type, but rather reflects its own ideology and 
self-understanding. Importantly, the results in Table 4 might also be driven by the fact that there 
is less variation on the dependent variable in the democratic sub-sample: there are 32 coup attempts 
in Model 5, but 99 and 93 in Model 6 and Model 7, respectively. Finally, the conditional hypothesis 
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is likely to apply more to disposition component of our theoretical argument rather than the ability 
mechanism. This could induce that while military academies increase coup risk by teaching the 
importance of corporate interests that could go against the incumbent political regimes, they 
simultaneously reduce coup risk by teaching the importance of civilian control of the militaries 
and non-military intervention in politics, which leads to the overall insignificance of Military 
Academy in the democratic sub-sample as two competing mechanisms cancel each other out. 
In terms of our controls, the findings in Tables 2 and 5 generally confirm previous results. We 
briefly discuss the statistically significant findings only. First, coups are less likely in democracies 
as compared to anocratic forms of government. Table 5 shows that this variable is linked to a 
decrease in coup risk of about 1.9 percentage points, mirroring our discussion of the variation on 
the dependent variable in Models 5-7. Autocratic regimes do not necessarily differ from 
anocracies, though, as depicted by the insignificant first difference in Table 5. A higher level of 
instability induces a higher coup risk: raising Instability from its minimum to its maximum leads 
to an increase in coup risk of about 3.5 percentage points.  
__________ 
Table 5 
__________ 
Second, while GDP per capita is not significantly related to coup risk, Change GDP per capita 
is. In Model 3, our calculations suggest that the likelihood of a coup decreases by about 34 
percentage points when moving Change GDP per capita from its minimum to its maximum. 
Moreover, our findings support the claim that larger militaries are less coup-prone (Powell 2012): 
Military Personnel is negatively signed and significant, while its first difference is estimated at a 
decrease of 4.7 percentage points. Soldier Quality, which rests on the same underlying theoretical 
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mechanism, mirrors this and is even more substantive in size: the first difference is at -0.389. 
Finally, Böhmelt and Pilster (2016) contend there is a curvilinear relationship between 
counterbalancing and coup risk. Our results find evidence for this claim and we shed more light 
on the substance of Counterbalancing in the appendix. 
 
Conclusion 
This study extends earlier research on military professionalism, education, and civil-military 
relations in general. The arguments and empirical analyses support the Unconditional Military 
Academy-Coup Hypothesis that military schools can shape cohesive views, which potentially 
conflict with incumbent policies, and create networks that facilitate coordination necessary for 
plotting a putsch. We also found evidence for the Conditional Military Academy-Coup Hypothesis 
that the effect of military academies varies by regime type. Given these results, understanding the 
potential destabilizing impact of military academies is highly relevant to Western governments, 
including the US and the UK, because military schools now take prominent roles in attempts to 
provide security-force assistance to fragile states that are mostly non-democratic or in the early 
stages of democratization.  
Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a certain fatigue and aversion against 
large-scale ground interventions and permanent missions. The emphasis of Western states’ 
military engagement has thus shifted toward security-force assistance. Instead of deploying large 
contingents of troops destined for ground combat, Western countries are currently focusing on 
training, advising, and assisting allied governments that face insurgencies (Biddle, McDonald, and 
Baker 2018). As of early 2018, the EU maintained training missions in Mali, Somalia, and the 
Central African Republic. NATO’s largest effort is the Train, Advise, and Assist mission in 
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Afghanistan, while a Global Coalition against Daesh trains Iraqi Security Forces. For the US, 
security force assistance has become the central means to project stability in areas where it no 
longer has sufficient forces to provide stability itself. In most occasions, the support or building of 
military educational institutions is a central element of attempts to deliver security-force 
assistance. NATO and especially the UK have, for instance, been prominently involved in 
supporting academies and schools. The purpose of those academies is to train the next generation 
of officers who are ultimately supposed to lead self-reliant indigenous armies. We have provided 
the first systematic, cross-national study linking military academies and coup risk and, thereby, 
highlight that Western states must take great care when establishing such institutions in some 
contexts. Despite “benign intentions,” Western efforts to establish military schools may in fact 
induce the negative externality of a somewhat higher coup risk in target states, which are to a large 
degree non-democratic or have only started a process of democratization 
Based on our work, future studies may want to further explore the conditions under which the 
negative-externality effect of military academies is stronger or weaker. Our analysis based on the 
forms of government is arguably a step in this direction, but, for example, previous research also 
shows that the different services and branches of the military are associated with coup risk in 
diverse ways (e.g., Böhmelt, Pilster, and Tago 2017). Further disaggregating the academy data in 
Toronto (2017) along army, navy, and air force seems an effort worth making. Likewise, how 
military academies are related to the outcome of coup attempts remains to be tested systematically, 
although the appendix presents preliminary evidence for a positive impact on coup success. In 
addition, our unconditional argument relies on two mechanisms, which may merit additional 
attention. Which of the two channels we have outlined is more influential in affecting the risk of a 
putsch? Most importantly, however, the finding that military academies are associated with a 
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higher likelihood of coups considered alongside the claim that these schools are a key indicator of 
professionalism in the armed forces sheds new light on the debate of how professionalism affects 
civil-military relations in general (Huntington 1957; Finer 1962). We conclude that military 
academies are an important vehicle that military officers can capitalize on in preparation of coup 
d’état, predominantly in authoritarian states. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. Mean SD Min Max VIF 
Coup Attempt 7,909 0.048 0.214 0 1 – 
Military Academy 5,088 0.744 0.437 0 1 1.28 
Democracy 7,074 0.361 0.480 0 1 2.23 
Autocracy 7,074 0.410 0.492 0 1 2.02 
Change Military Expenditure 6,783 0.477 24.063 -1.000 1,965.292 1.03 
Soldier Quality 6,711 8.552 1.583 0.000 14.698 2.18 
Military Personnel  7,621 3.407 1.942 0.000 8.666 1.36 
Counterbalancing 4,872 1.650 0.628 1.000 4.577 1.09 
Counterbalancing2 4,872 3.116 2.490 1.000 20.951 – 
Change GDP per capita 8,065 0.022 0.265 -0.797 20.794 1.00 
GDP per capita 8,069 8.283 1.214 4.889 13.357 2.63 
Instability 7,523 3.245 3.602 0.000 10.852 1.21 
 
Note: Variables for temporal correction and the interaction of Military Academy with the regime-type items are 
omitted from the table. The last column presents variance inflation factors, which demonstrate that 
multicollinearity is not a major issue (threshold value of 5). 
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Table 2. The Relationship between Coups d’état and Military Academies – Main Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Military Academy  0.533  0.698  0.610 
 (0.211)** (0.209)*** (0.252)** 
Democracy  -0.829 -1.097 
  (0.275)*** (0.303)*** 
Autocracy  -0.141 -0.121 
  (0.176) (0.237) 
Change Military Expenditure  -0.131 -0.112 
  (0.182) (0.177) 
Soldier Quality  -0.196 -0.406 
  (0.074)*** (0.129)*** 
Military Personnel  -0.185 -0.215 
  (0.057)*** (0.071)*** 
Counterbalancing   -1.349 
   (0.811)* 
Counterbalancing2    0.376 
   (0.201)* 
Change GDP per capita  -3.665 -3.930 
  (0.668)*** (0.898)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.168 -0.083 
  (0.114) (0.131) 
Instability   0.128  0.131 
  (0.028)*** (0.034)*** 
Constant -2.084  0.886  3.254 
 (0.188)*** (0.865) (1.405)** 
Obs. 5,088 4,339 3,015 
Time Period 1950-2004 1951-2004 1970-2004 
Pseudo Log Likelihood -889.474 -702.450 -384.410 
Wald c2 106.02*** 300.48*** 205.47*** 
Expected Proportional Reduction in Error 0.050 0.104 0.109 
Area under Precision-Recall Curve 0.145 0.214 0.210 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses. 
The variables for temporal correction are included, but omitted from the presentation. 
 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed) 
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Table 3. Different Lag Structures for Military Academy 
  Coefficient Estimate 
Lag 1 0.697 
 (0.217)*** 
Lag 2 0.558 
 (0.200)*** 
Lag 3 0.495 
 (0.203)** 
Lag 4 0.553 
 (0.209)*** 
Lag 5 0.590 
 (0.213)*** 
Lag 6 0.710 
 (0.200)*** 
Lag 7 0.824 
 (0.164)*** 
Lag 8 0.794 
 (0.176)*** 
Lag 9 0.788 
 (0.167)*** 
Lag 10 0.851 
 (0.161)*** 
Lag 11 0.933 
 (0.184)*** 
Lag 12 0.833 
 (0.183)*** 
Lag 13 0.873 
 (0.203)*** 
Lag 14 0.929 
 (0.211)*** 
Lag 15 0.948 
 (0.211)*** 
Lag 16 1.189 
 (0.211)*** 
Lag 17 1.179 
 (0.210)*** 
Lag 18 1.187 
 (0.201)*** 
Lag 19 1.275 
 (0.220)*** 
Lag 20 0.925 
 (0.258)*** 
 
** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed) 
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Table 4. Exploring the Conditional Hypothesis 
  Model 4 Model 5 (Democracies) 
Model 6 
(Autocracies) 
Model 7 
(Anocracies) 
Military Academy  0.567  0.864  0.777  0.501 
 (0.286)** (0.597) (0.302)*** (0.266)* 
Democracy -1.155    
 (0.666)*    
Military Academy * Democracy  0.361    
 (0.717)    
Autocracy -0.285    
 (0.336)    
Military Academy * Autocracy  0.174    
 (0.408)    
Change Military Expenditure -0.131 -1.047 -0.083  0.005 
 (0.181) (0.608)* (0.211) (0.221) 
Soldier Quality -0.198 -0.199 -0.094 -0.315 
 (0.073)*** (0.274) (0.114) (0.108)*** 
Military Personnel -0.185 -0.238 -0.263 -0.094 
 (0.057)*** (0.156) (0.083)*** (0.099) 
Change GDP per capita -3.636 -8.366 -3.583 -2.775 
 (0.677)*** (3.472)** (0.969)*** (1.126)** 
GDP per capita -0.165 -0.146 -0.047 -0.244 
 (0.114) (0.270) (0.133) (0.167) 
Instability  0.127  0.180  0.144  0.084 
 (0.028)*** (0.082)** (0.043)*** (0.038)** 
Constant  0.998  0.117 -0.761  2.346 
 (0.874) (2.549) (1.156) (1.322)* 
Obs. 4,339 1,841 1,558 940 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -702.307 -122.612 -303.264 -266.592 
Wald c2 311.64 84.67 97.60 92.59 
Prob>c2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses. 
The variables for temporal correction are included, but omitted from the presentation. 
 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed) 
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Table 5. Control Variables: First Differences 
  
First Difference 90 Percent Lower 
Bound 
90 Percent Upper 
Bound 
Democracy -0.019 -0.032 -0.008 
Autocracy -0.003 -0.014 0.007 
Change Military Expenditure 0.318 -0.048 0.982 
Soldier Quality -0.389 -0.768 -0.073 
Military Personnel  -0.047 -0.087 -0.015 
Change GDP per capita -0.335 -0.574 -0.137 
GDP per capita -0.020 -0.063 0.018 
Instability 0.035 0.016 0.059 
 
Note: A first difference is the change in the probability that Coup Attempt=1 associated with a 
change from the minimum to the maximum value of a specific variable while holding all other 
covariates at their median. Counterbalancing and its square term are omitted due to the curvilinear 
impact on the outcome. The calculations are based on Model 3. 
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Figure 1. Number of Military Academies Worldwide, 1950-2004 
 
 
Note: Graph depicts maximum number of military academies a country had in any year between 
1950 and 2004. The data used for this graph are based on Toronto (2017), which are described in 
the research design. 
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Figure 2. Spatio-Temporal Patterns of Military Academy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Graph displays average level of Military Academy by regions as defined in the Correlates of 
War data. 
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Figure 3. First Difference Estimates for Military Academy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Graph displays first-difference point estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals (vertical 
bars) for Coup Attempt=1 associated with a change from 0 to 1 for Military Academy while holding 
all other covariates at their median. 
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Figure 4. The Interaction of Military Academy with Democracy and Autocracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Graph displays predicted probabilities for a coup attempt given the values of Military 
Academy and conditional on Democracy. The vertical bars pertain to 90 percent confidence 
intervals. The predicted probability of 0 marked with grey horizontal line. 
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